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INTRODUCTION
In footnote eleven of the Brown' opinion, the Supreme Court
famously cited social science evidence in support of the proposition
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law,
Yale Law School (2002-2003). A.B., 1988, Yale University; J.D., 1992, University of
Virginia School of Law. This Essay was initially prepared for a conference, The
Resegregation of Southern Schools?: A Crucial Moment in the History (and the Future) of
Public Schooling in America, held at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
August 29-30, 2002, and sponsored by the Civil Rights Project of Harvard University and
the University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Jack Boger, Chris Edley, John
Harrison, Michael Heise, Mike Klarman, Jacinta Ma, Liz Magill, John Monahan, Crystal
Gafford Muhammad, Peter Schuck, and Larry Walker for helpful comments and
discussions, and to Megan Strackbein for excellent research assistance.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that segregated schools harmed African-American students.2 This
footnote ignited a debate over both the quality of the research cited
and the extent to which it influenced the outcome of the case.' While
this tired debate continues today,' surprisingly little attention has
been devoted to the significance of social science evidence in
contemporary desegregation cases. That is the focus of this Essay.
There are currently two main sets of "desegregation" cases being
litigated. One involves attempts to dissolve desegregation decrees,
and the central question is whether the school district has sufficiently
eliminated the prior vestiges of discrimination to justify declaring the
district unitary.' The other involves challenges to voluntary
integration plans, and the central question is whether the voluntary
use of race to assign or admit students to grade schools satisfies a
compelling state interest.6  As the papers for this Conference
demonstrate, we are awash in social science evidence that is
potentially relevant to both sets of cases, and this evidence is
undoubtedly interesting and important to both scholars and
policymakers. The main question I would like to address, however, is
whether this evidence is all that important to courts, or, put
differently, the extent to which social science evidence influences the
outcomes of modern desegregation cases.
"Social science evidence" is a fairly amorphous term, so let me
be clear about what I mean. By the use of this phrase I do not mean
2. Id. at 494 n.11.
3. See generally Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social
Scientists' Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224 (1959-60) (supporting the use of social science
evidence in desegregation cases); Stuart W. Cook, Social Science and School
Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 420 (1979) (evaluating the validity of sources cited in Brown in light of subsequent
research); Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science Role, 38 AM.
PSYCHOL. 869 (1983) (criticizing the science cited in Brown); Ernest van den Haag, Social
Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6
VILL. L. REV. 69 (1960) (criticizing Kenneth Clark's article).
4. See, e.g., Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 803-14
(2002) (describing and continuing the debate over footnote eleven).
5. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,485-92 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237,244-46 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (holding that the school board's race-based policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 792 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
the Boston School Board violated the Equal Protection Clause by making race a
determining factor in admissions decisions at public examination schools); see also John
Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of




to include all statements of fact about the current state of the world,
which might be gathered by, say, demographers or other social
scientists. Instead, I mean to refer to social science studies that
generally seek to establish correlation or causation. Most specifically,
I am interested in the mound of social science evidence regarding the
actual benefits and costs of school desegregation, either in terms of
academic achievement, improved social relations, or greater "life
prospects." It would underestimate the amount of attention social
scientists have devoted to this topic to call it a cottage industry.7 I am
interested in whether this research matters much to courts.
Let me start with a hopefully provocative and obviously bald
answer, and then backtrack slightly by admitting a caveat. For
reasons I will explain, it seems dubious that social science evidence
plays an influential role in these cases. Put differently, and more
pointedly, in my view, social science research will not prevent the
dismantling of desegregation decrees or save voluntary integration
plans. At the same time, however, I readily admit that there is no
good way to determine directly the influence of social science
evidence on court decisions. Court opinions are only partially
helpful, insofar as they might discuss the social science evidence
presented and comment on its strengths or weaknesses. But even
when courts do discuss the evidence, which is not always the case, it is
impossible to know whether the evidence influenced the outcome or
whether the evidence is being cited to support an outcome reached
for other reasons. (Brown itself, and the endless debate regarding the
significance of footnote eleven, is the perfect cautionary tale here.)
Conversely, even where court opinions do not discuss social science
evidence, it is possible that social science research, at some point in
time, influenced the judge's views of the pertinent legal issue.
It might be possible to survey judges in an attempt to understand
the factors that influenced their decisions. One might also conduct
regression analyses in an effort to isolate the variable most likely to
have influenced the outcome in these cases. These investigative
techniques, however, are likely to turn up incomplete and unreliable
data, as one could never be certain that the judges surveyed were
being candid or that all of the relevant variables were considered in a
regression analysis. Beyond this, one could gather anecdotal
evidence from various trials that might shed partial light on the extent
to which courts seemed interested in or persuaded by the
7. For a discussion of this body of research, see, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race,
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,296-307 (1999).
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presentation of social science evidence.8 But this evidence would also
be incomplete and fairly unreliable.
It seems, then, that the only way to approach the question is
indirectly, by considering the circumstances that would make social
science evidence more or less influential in a particular case or
context. Accordingly, my argument does not rest upon survey data or
statistical analysis, but rather upon several observations and some
hopefully reasonable speculations that together suggest the strong
unlikelihood that social science evidence influences the outcome of
modern desegregation cases.
To begin, it seems likely that the relevance and influence of
social science evidence in any context will largely be a function of
three related factors: (1) the legal standards applied; (2) the nature
and strength of the social science evidence presented; and (3) the
nature of the issues presented.
As for the first factor, the legal standards establish the questions
that must be answered in order to resolve the case. The more
empirically based the questions, the more relevant and important
social science evidence becomes. The more normative, value-laden,
or abstract the questions, the less relevant and important the social
science evidence. 9 Legal standards also dictate the burdens of proof
and sometimes establish presumptions, which in turn affect the
relative importance of social science evidence. Even where the
questions asked could be answered or informed by social science
evidence, the second factor-the relative quality, consistency, and
overall strength of the social science evidence presented-will
obviously affect the extent to which courts rely upon it. The more
determinate the evidence, the more influential it might be; the more
mixed and inconclusive it is, the less likely it is that courts will rely
heavily upon it in reaching (as opposed to merely bolstering) a
decision.
The third factor, the nature of the issues involved, is admittedly a
bit vague and overlaps to a certain extent with the legal standards.
What I mean to capture is the notion that if judges perceive an issue
as involving moral or philosophical judgments, as opposed to
pragmatic or instrumental ones, they are less likely to rely heavily on
8. See, e.g., MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING
EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 203-34 (1988) (exploring how social
science evidence altered judicial understanding of segregation cases).
9. See Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1978, at 57, 74-75.
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social science evidence to resolve the issue, even if the legal standards
allow for the consideration of such evidence and even if the evidence
is fairly determinate. In addition, intuition and some empirical
research suggest that ideology and personal preference will at least
occasionally influence a judge's or justice's decision." Common sense
suggests that the more familiar and politically salient an issue, the
greater the potential for ideology and preference to play influential
roles. When these two conditions are both present-an issue is
politically salient and perceived in moral or philosophical terms-the
likelihood that social science research will influence the outcome
seems quite slim. 1
These three factors are interrelated in a number of ways. For
example, the less room that legal standards provide for the
consideration of social science evidence, the less influential it will be,
regardless of its strength. At the same time, the more that social
science evidence is mixed, the more likely it is that courts will rely on
ideology and personal preference in reaching an outcome. Weak or
contradictory social science evidence might also play a role in the
creation of legal standards that avoid reliance on such evidence.
Similarly, the more politically salient an issue, or the more a court
believes that resolving the issue requires moral or philosophical
judgments, the less likely it is that courts will create legal standards
that make an outcome turn on the state of social science evidence,
however determinate it might be.
In the two sets of desegregation cases currently being litigated,
these three factors, alone and in combination, point against the
proposition that social science evidence plays an influential role. The
legal standards that courts use to decide the cases do not offer much
room for social science evidence to influence the decisions. The
questions that are asked do not easily or ultimately admit empirical
10. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
11. To illustrate, most racial classifications must satisfy a compelling state interest in
order to be considered constitutional, as explained below. See infra Part I.A.
Determining what counts as a compelling interest could be informed or determined by
social science evidence regarding the costs and benefits of particular racial classifications.
But it need not be, as demonstrated by the Court's conclusion that race may be used to
remedy past discrimination. Determining what counts as a compelling interest does not
foreclose or require the use of social science evidence. Thus, what will likely determine
the influence of social science evidence on court decisions will be the extent to which
courts are inclined to rely on such evidence, which will depend in part on whether courts
think this is the sort of issue that ought to be decided by reference to social science data.
This determination, in turn, will likely depend on whether the court sees the issue (what is
a compelling interest?) in moral and philosophical terms and whether the court has
preconceived views about the issue.
2003] 1663
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answers. Even where social science evidence could provide a partial
answer, moreover, the evidence itself is more often than not
conflicting or inconclusive. Finally, it seems fairly clear that judges,
and especially Supreme Court Justices, view the central issues-such
as when to terminate desegregation decrees or when to allow race to
be used in government decisionmaking-in moral or philosophical
terms. It seems equally reasonable to suppose that most federal
judges have quite strong personal views on these issues. If these
observations and arguments are correct, it follows that social science
evidence probably has little influence on modern desegregation
decisions. To be sure, one might be able to point to exceptional cases,
where it seems plain that social science evidence influenced the
outcome. But these exceptions should not, I think, detract from the
central argument of this Essay, which is that the deck is strongly
stacked against social scientists who wish to influence the outcome of
contemporary desegregation cases.
If this is not sufficient to alienate or depress the social scientists
(and perhaps some of the lawyers) in the crowd, I will go one step
further and consider more recent, but less prevalent, programs and
legal claims designed to achieve school integration. Specifically, I will
examine the legality of socioeconomic integration plans,
desegregation claims based on state education clauses, and challenges
to school district lines based on the disparate impact regulations
promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.12 Although these programs and legal
claims may offer some hope of achieving integration, and at least one
of the claims allows some room for social science evidence to play an
influential role, I will argue that the ability of social science evidence
to influence the outcome of any relevant court decisions remains
fairly limited.
This Essay has three Parts. The first Part will begin by describing
the use of social science evidence in older desegregation cases in
order to place in context the subsequent discussion of the Court's
recent cases concerning the dismantling of desegregation decrees.
Part Two will address cases concerning the constitutionality of
voluntary integration plans, and Part Three examines alternative
approaches and legal claims seeking to achieve some measure of
racial and/or socioeconomic integration. I conclude with some
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).
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suggested strategies for lawyers and social scientists interested in
fostering racial and socioeconomic integration.
I. DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION DECREES
A. The Legal Standards
The legal standards established by the Court for the dissolution
of desegregation decrees allow little room for social science evidence
to influence, much less dictate, the outcome. In this regard, the
standards are consistent with those used in earlier desegregation
cases. Indeed, it is striking how the standards and presumptions
developed throughout the entire course of desegregation litigation
have allowed relatively little room for the consideration of social
science evidence. To see this, and to set the stage for a discussion of
the Court's most recent desegregation decisions, it is helpful to review
the Court's early opinions. The place to begin, as always, is with
Brown itself.
1. Early Desegregation Cases
Brown was the first and only desegregation decision by the
United States Supreme Court that at least appeared to rest on social
science evidence regarding the harm that segregated schools inflicted
on black students. Notwithstanding some lingering debate, it seems
very unlikely that the evidence cited in footnote eleven actually
influenced the outcome in Brown. First, it was just a footnote, after
all, to paraphrase Chief Justice Warren's response to the attention the
note received.13 More than this, it is difficult to reconcile the notion
that social science evidence was determinative in Brown with the fact
that the Court relied on its decision in Brown, and nothing more, to
outlaw segregated golf courses, 4 buses, 5 and beaches.16 If social
science evidence establishing the harm of segregated schools actually
played a role in the outcome of Brown, it is difficult to understand
how the Court could have struck down segregation in other contexts
solely on the basis of Brown. Finally, accounts of those who drafted
the opinion, as well as an understanding of the political history
surrounding the decision, strongly suggest that the evidence was cited
13. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1975) ("Then [Warren] added, by way
of stressing that the sociology was merely supportive and not the substance of the holding,
'It was only a note, after all.' ").
14. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
15. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
16. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
2003] 1665
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to bolster and obfuscate what was at the time a fairly controversial
normative conclusion that segregation-like the decision to allow it in
Plessy v. Ferguson7-was morally wrong."8
The Court temporarily disappeared from the desegregation field
after Brown I and the "all deliberate speed" decision the next year in
Brown H.9 When the Court returned to the field in the late 1960s,
however, it issued three opinions-Green,2 ° Swann,2 and Keyes2 -
that established aggressive remedial standards for desegregation
cases. In so doing, it created presumptions that precluded much
reliance on social science data regarding the causes of current
segregation. Green and Swann established the presumption that any
present segregation was the result of prior acts of segregation,23 and
Keyes established the presumption that intentional acts of segregation
in one part of a school district caused segregation throughout the
district.24 These presumptions, in turn, were practically irrebuttable,
as they required defendants to prove a negative: that current
segregation or segregation in one part of a district was not caused by
prior acts of segregation or segregation elsewhere in a district. These
remedial standards also gave little consideration to whether minority
students were actually better off in integrated schools. The Court's
remedial mandate required school districts to achieve the maximum
extent of desegregation practicable, period." Whether black students
in a particular district might be better off socially and academically
were they to remain in neighborhood schools was simply irrelevant in
this equation.
26
In Milliken 1,27 decided in 1974, the Court severely restricted the
potential for interdistrict remedies and dealt a crushing blow to urban
desegregation. 8 Cross-district busing could only be ordered if there
were proof of an interdistrict violation, such as an intentional
redrawing of district lines, or if intentional segregation in one district
had segregative effects in another. Given the already pervasive
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18. See Mody, supra note 4, at 811-28.
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
20. Green v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
21. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
22. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
23. Swann, 402 U.S. at 26; Green, 391 U.S. at 437-39.
24. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
25. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
26. Cf, e.g., Gerard, supra note 3, at 872-75 (questioning the benefits of school
desegregation for minority students).
27. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
28. Id. at 741-45.
1666 [Vol. 81
SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
residential segregation that plagued most metropolitan areas,
gerrymandering district lines was hardly necessary. States could leave
in place existing school district lines, which outside of the South were
usually coterminous with municipal boundaries, and residential
segregation between cities and suburbs would take care of the rest.
The legal standard created in Milliken I was obviously quite
formal and blind to the demographic realities of most metropolitan
areas. The standard, for example, made it legally irrelevant that a
desegregation plan limited to a predominantly minority school district
would obviously not result in much integration. In addition, the
standard allowed for no consideration of the benefits of metropolitan-
wide school desegregation. Plaintiffs could not obtain interdistrict
relief, for example, by demonstrating that an interdistrict plan would
bring greater benefits to all involved than would a plan limited to a
single district. To be sure, the Milliken I Court's construction of such
a formal standard could have been influenced by a hunch that the
costs of interdistrict busing outweighed its benefits, but there is little
hint in the opinion (and little reason to believe) that the Court relied
much on social science research to inform its view on this issue.29
Several years later, in Milliken 1,3 ° the Court sought to cushion
the blow of Milliken I by allowing remedial and compensatory
education programs to be part of a desegregation remedy.3 The
opinion in Milliken H typified the Court's approach to proof in these
cases, which at times bordered on selfparody. The Court proclaimed,
as it did in every desegregation decision from Swann forward, that the
remedy must be tailored to the constitutional violation and that it
must return plaintiffs to the position that they would have occupied
had their constitutional rights been respected in the first place.32 The
uninitiated might have believed from this that plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate with some precision that prior acts of segregation caused
current educational disparities. However, those who had seen this
principle in action in earlier cases, ranging from Green and Swann
(where all-out desegregation was ordered on the basis of this
principle) to Milliken I (where all-out desegregation was denied on
the basis of this principle) would have known better.
29. There is also good reason to believe that the intense popular and political
opposition to interdistrict busing influenced the Court's decision. See James E. Ryan &
Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2052-56
(2002).
30. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,280-88 (1977) (Milliken IH).
31. Id. at 280-88.
32. Id. at 280-81.
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The Court did not disappoint the cynics. Citing expert testimony
that contained such gems as "[w]e think [that guidance counseling]
certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort[;] we
think it deserves special emphasis," and opining in classic armchair
fashion about the impact of segregation on the "speech habits" of
minority students, the Court approved the inclusion of state-funded
remedial education programs in desegregation decrees.33 The Court
repeatedly admonished those who were listening that "it must always
be shown that the constitutional violation caused the condition for
which remedial programs are mandated."34  Those who were
watching, however, would have noticed that the Court essentially
presumed a causal link between prior acts of segregation and current
educational disparities, and in so doing suggested that lower courts
could and should follow suit. This is not to say, of course, that social
science evidence would have failed to establish a causal link between
prior segregation and a current need for remedial education. My
point is that demonstrating such a link with rigor hardly seemed
necessary in light of the Court's approach.
By the late 1970s, the basic legal framework for implementing
desegregation decrees was thus established, and social science
research relating to the causes of current segregation or the harms
and benefits of forced busing was at best tangentially useful to the
task of implementation. A lingering question remained, however,
and that was simply: When should this end-at what point should
desegregation decrees be lifted? After remaining silent in the 1980s,
the Court decided three cases in the early 1990s that confronted this
question directly. Just as the standards for implementing
desegregation decrees offered little room for social science evidence
to influence decisions, the standards for dissolving such decrees also
cabin the relevance and influence of social science research.
2. Contemporary Desegregation Decisions
In Dowell 5 and Freeman,36 decided in 1991 and 1992,
respectively, the Court established standards to determine when
desegregation decrees could be completely or partially lifted.37 In
Dowell, the Court held that school districts should be declared
unitary and court supervision should end when it could be shown that
33. Id. at 274, 287-88.
34. Id. at 286 n. 17.
35. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
36. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
37. Id. at 485-92; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
1668 [Vol. 81
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the district "had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree
since it was entered, and [that] the vestiges of past discrimination had
been eliminated to the extent practicable. ' 38 To determine whether
the vestiges have been eliminated, the Court instructed lower courts
to consider not only student assignment but also the other so called
Green factors: "faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities
and facilities. '39 In Freeman, the Court held that district courts could
relinquish partial control over school districts if they are satisfied that
the school district has fulfilled its obligations with respect to one or
more of the Green factors." The standards for determining partial
unitary status are essentially identical to those articulated in Dowell.
Courts should determine, with regard to one or more of the Green
factors, whether the district has acted in "good faith ... and ...
whether the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to
the extent practicable."4
In Jenkins,42 decided in 1995, the Court addressed when Milliken
H remedies, relating to compensatory and remedial education
programs, should cease.43 The Court held that the same standards
articulated in Dowell and Freeman should apply, and it added that
lower courts should seek to remedy only "the incremental effect that
segregation has had on minority student achievement."'4A Thus, "[t]he
basic task of the District Court is to decide whether the reduction in
achievement by minority students attributable to prior de jure
segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable.
45
All three decisions send unmistakable signals that district courts
should begin winding up the process of desegregation. In each
opinion, the Court stressed the importance of returning schools to
local control, emphasizing that this is the ultimate objective of any
desegregation suit. Indeed, the Court suggested in Freeman that
schools should be returned to "the control of local authorities at the
earliest practicable date."4 6  The Court also emphasized that the
38. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.
39. Id. at 250.
40. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490-91.
41. Id. at 491-92. The Court in Freeman also held that district courts should retain
supervision over one Green factor if doing so is necessary to achieve compliance with
regard to another factor, but it is hard to understand when this situation would arise. Id.
It does not, in any event, seem to play a role in lower court decisions.
42. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
43. Id. at 101.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; see also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102 (stating that local
control is important); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (same).
2003] 1669
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passage of time, combined with good faith efforts on the part of
school districts, made court control less justifiable. In Freeman, for
example, the Court reasoned that the passage of time made it less
plausible to attribute current racial imbalances among schools to
prior acts of de jure segregation.47 Finally, the Court stressed that
forces beyond the control of the school district might be primarily
responsible for current conditions in schools. In Jenkins, the Court
stressed that "numerous external factors beyond the control of [the
school district and the state] affect minority student achievement."48
Similarly, in Freeman, the Court suggested that demographic changes
independent of prior acts of de jure segregation might be the primary
cause of current racial imbalance in the schools.49
What does all of this portend for the usefulness of social science
evidence in cases involving the question of whether desegregation
decrees should be partially or completely lifted? As I read the three
Supreme Court decisions, as well as lower court cases applying these
precedents, there is very little room for social science research to
influence a unitary status determination.
To begin, it is important to notice what is not factored into the
decision as to whether decrees should be dissolved. There is no
consideration of whether black or white students are currently
benefiting from the desegregation plan at issue. Studies about the
benefits of integrated education are thus formally irrelevant to the
determination of unitary status. In addition, there is little
consideration of the impact that lifting the decree will have on
students. It is irrelevant that schools might become resegregated
once decrees are lifted and districts reinstitute neighborhood school
policies, and it is irrelevant that minority students might suffer if
remedial programs are discontinued. 0 Right from the start, then, the
bulk of social science studies concerning the costs and benefits of
racially integrated schools are relegated to the sidelines of the unitary
status inquiry. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this point:
the plain truth is that most of the research presented at this
Conference-regarding either the resegregation of schools if decrees
47. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 496.
48. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102.
49. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494-96.
50. For example, in Oklahoma City, there was no doubt that the schools would
become resegregated once the decree was lifted, yet this fact did not preclude a finding of
unitary status. See Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1160-66 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
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are dismantled or the benefits of continuing desegregation plansl'-is
simply irrelevant to the legal standards that govern unitary status
determinations.
Consider, next, the questions that are asked. Social science
evidence is hardly necessary to determine whether a district has acted
in good faith. If the district can show that it complied with court
orders and did not actively seek to thwart the effect of those orders, it
should be able to satisfy this prong of the inquiry. 2 Social science
evidence could in theory help determine whether the vestiges of prior
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. Under
this prong of the unitary status inquiry, districts must prove that
current conditions, particularly those related to racial imbalance, are
not traceable to prior acts of segregation. At first blush, it might
appear both that school districts retain a heavy burden and that social
science research about the causes of current conditions could play an
influential role in this determination.
A closer look demonstrates otherwise. To begin, it is important
to understand how this burden of proof actually operates. Initially, it
appears that the presumption established in Green and Swann still
holds, meaning that all current conditions of racial imbalance are
presumed to be the result of prior acts of segregation, unless the
school district can demonstrate otherwise. The Court, however,
shifted this presumption, subtly but importantly, in Freeman. It did so
by emphasizing that demographic changes that occur after a court has
implemented a desegregation decree can suffice to sever the link
between prior acts of segregation and current levels of racial
imbalance.53 Importantly, the school district need not disprove that
51. See generally Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor, Segregation
and Resegregation in North Carolina's Public School Classrooms, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1463
(2003) (finding marked increases in classroom segregation); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The
Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513 (2003) (concluding that resegregation
following a "unitary status" finding threatens the significant educational benefits
desegregation has thus far produced); Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating
Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School Segregation in the South,
1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (2003) (noting an increase in school segregation despite
substantial declines in residential segregation).
52. See, e.g., NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 974-76
(11th Cir. 2001) (finding good faith in the school board's fulfillment of obligations);
Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 945-47 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding good faith by looking
at the school board's policies); Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501, 1511-12 (10th Cir.
1993) (finding good faith compliance).
53. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495-96 ("Where resegregation is a product not of state
action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications.").
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the demographic changes themselves are traceable to prior acts of
segregation.
In practical terms, this has meant that school districts can rebut
the presumption that current racial imbalances are a vestige of prior
discrimination simply by introducing demographic data that describe
residential changes that have occurred since the initial desegregation
decree was implemented. 4 Thus, in Freeman, the Court suggested
that the school district could sever the link between prior and present
segregation by showing that the desegregation decree was designed to
achieve integration but was quickly rendered ineffective by changes
in residential patterns." Once such a showing is made, the burden
effectively shifts back to the party seeking to resist a finding of
unitary status, who must prove that the changed residential patterns
themselves are the product of prior acts of segregation.56
It is theoretically possible that a sophisticated social science
study might be able to establish a connection between current
patterns of residential segregation and prior acts of school
segregation. In reality, however, this is probably impossible to do
with any degree of precision or certainty. The causes of current
residential segregation are many and tangled.57 Separating out the
various causal strands and identifying prior acts of school segregation
as a determinant factor is likely beyond the capabilities of social
science research.
Jenkins adds to the difficulties facing those interested in
maintaining desegregation decrees, as it also shifts the traditional
presumption about causation. Professor Wendy Parker astutely
identified this shift in a recent article, where she described how the
54. See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 322-23 (4th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Long periods of almost perfect compliance with the court's racial
balance guidelines, coupled with some imbalance in the wake of massive demographic
shifts, strongly supports the district court's finding that the present levels of imbalance are
in no way connected with the de jure segregation once practiced in CMS."),
reconsideration denied en banc, 274 F.3d (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002);
accord NAACP, 273 F.3d at 967-73 (citing racial imbalances caused by demographic
factors); Manning, 244 F.3d at 943-44 (stating that demographic shifts caused racial
imbalances); Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 226-28 (5th Cir. 1983)
(finding that current segregation was caused by housing patterns).
55. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495-96.
56. See, e.g., NAACP, 273 F.3d at 971-72 (finding that school board policy did not
contribute to the reemergence of segregated schools); Manning, 244 F.3d at 944-45
(finding that current racial imbalances were not caused by prior school segregation
policies).
57. For further discussion of this point and citations to the literature, see Ryan, supra
note 7, at 276-80.
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Court in Jenkins resurrected the "incremental effect" standard that it
had toyed with briefly in the 1970s but then discarded." Prior to
Jenkins, school districts were typically presumed responsible for
current conditions, including disparities in achievement, unless they
could show that prior acts of segregation did not play a causal role. In
Jenkins, however, the Court stated that district courts must identify
"the incremental effect that segregation has had on minority student
achievement."59 The Court said nothing about the burden of proof,
but notice the effect of this requirement. Gone is the presumption
that all disparities in achievement are the result of prior segregation;
courts now are charged with identifying the causes of those disparities
and apportioning responsibility accordingly. As Professor Parker
suggests, this seems to require that plaintiffs, not the school district,
establish the incremental effect of prior segregation on current levels
of achievement.6" Such a showing will be difficult, if not impossible,
to make, as the factors that affect achievement are numerous and
hard to isolate, making it quite difficult to apportion responsibility
and thereby identify incremental effects. Indeed, the Court in Jenkins
recognized as much, stating that "numerous external factors beyond
the control of [the school district and the state] affect minority
student achievement."61
Even were social science research helpful in establishing causal
links between prior acts of segregation and current conditions-be
they racial imbalance in schools or achievement disparities-the
Court's three opinions strongly indicate that other factors should
ultimately determine when decrees are lifted. Most importantly, the
opinions emphasize that district courts should consider the
importance of local control when deciding whether to lift
desegregation decrees.62 Relatedly, the opinions also suggest that
court control has lasted quite long and that at some point, regardless
of the evidence about causation and current conditions, local control
should be restored. Indeed, this seems to be the primary point of
including the caveat that vestiges of discrimination should be
58. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1172
(2000).
59. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995).
60. Parker, supra note 58, at 1173.
61. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102.
62. Id. at 99; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 248 (1990).
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eliminated "to the extent practicable," which invites courts to conclude
simply that enough has been enough.63
Social science research, of course, cannot tell a court how to
value local control, nor can it specify the appropriate duration of
desegregation decrees. These determinations require value
judgments about federalism and the proper role of federal courts. A
close reading of all three opinions together suggests that, ultimately,
these value judgments should dictate the outcome of unitary status
cases. In theory, social science evidence about the benefits of
integration or about the causes of current conditions could indirectly
influence the decisions, insofar as it might shape a judge's or Justice's
values or beliefs about the proper role of courts and the wisdom of
continuing court oversight of school districts. The available social
science research, however, does not seem up to this task, as the next
section describes.
B. The Nature and Strength of the Social Science Evidence
There are two types of social science studies that could play a
role in unitary status cases. Studies about the current causes of racial
imbalance or racial disparities in achievement are certainly relevant
to the determination of whether the vestiges of prior discrimination
have been eliminated to the extent practicable. For reasons already
explained, however, these studies are likely to be of limited use, at
best. I may be underestimating the capacity of social science, but it
seems plain that linking prior acts of school segregation either to
current racial imbalances or educational disparities simply cannot be
done with much precision. As a result, whoever bears the ultimate
burden of proof on these issues will likely lose.
The second set of studies, which addresses the costs and benefits
of school desegregation, is notoriously mixed and hotly debated.
There appears to be something of a scholarly consensus that
desegregation does benefit minority students academically, at least
somewhat, and that it does not harm white students. There is also
63. See, e.g., Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 760
(3rd Cir. 1996) ("Given the Court's recent assertion that federal supervision of local
school districts 'was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination,' we
underscore that the phrase 'to the extent practicable' implies a reasonable limit on the
duration of that federal supervision.") (internal citation omitted); accord Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 318 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (citing
Coalition, 90 F.3d at 760) (stating that "to the extent practicable" implies a reasonable
limit of duration), reconsideration denied en banc, 274 F.3d (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 986 (2002); Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 943 n.29 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing
Coalition, 90 F.3d at 760) (same).
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some consensus that integration, under certain conditions, improves
social relations and can enhance opportunities for minorities seeking
higher education and well paid employment. At the same time,
however, there are skeptics and naysayers among social scientists who
seek to refute the proposition that desegregation produces academic
improvement, better social relations, or better opportunities beyond
grade school.'
Perhaps even more importantly, the research appears
politicized.65 To be blunt, a number of social scientists studying
desegregation seem precommitted to particular findings. One can
often predict the conclusions of a report based on the identity of the
author. This is not to suggest that it is impossible to assess whether
one report is more trustworthy than another, but reports authored by
social scientists who consistently adhere to divergent positions will
likely breed skepticism among courts about the usefulness of social
science evidence.
This is speculative, to be sure, but I suspect that some of the
skepticism can be traced to the effect that legal realism and its more
modern progeny continue to have on contemporary lawyers and
judges. To oversimplify, law is no longer considered a science, nor do
lawyers and judges generally believe that law is to be found by courts
rather than made by them. It is widely accepted that personal
opinions and ideology play an influential role in judicial outcomes,
perhaps especially in the arena of constitutional law.6 6 In this view,
constitutional or statutory text, or court precedent, exerts a fairly
minimal constraint on judges or Justices interested in reaching a
result that accords with their personal preferences, however formed.
Such a view of lawmaking among courts inevitably breeds a certain
amount of skepticism, much of it healthy, about claims to objectivity
and neutrality. Indeed, law students for decades have been taught to
pay less attention to what a court says than to what is "really" going
64. For a discussion of the social science evidence, see Ryan, supra note 7, at 297-307.
65. I am obviously not the first to notice this. For an earlier and harsher assessment,
see Jeffrey Prager et al., The Desegregation Situation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 5 (Jeffrey Prager et al.
eds., 1986) ("School desegregation research has lost credibility. Where scientific studies
have typically played a pivotal role in American society to forge consensus by
transcending ideological divisions, here they entered into the political fray and lost their
ability to arbitrate.").
66. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through a Historical Lens, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1721, 1724-25 (2001) (arguing that partisan politics influenced the Justices'
decision).
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on in a case-meaning what really motivated a court to decide a case
in a particular way.67
I suspect this view of the law colors a judge's view of social
science studies, especially where those studies conflict and authors
consistently fall into one camp or another. Whether appropriate or
not, judges and lawyers may apply their skepticism about how law is
made to their view about how social science research is conducted.
That is, they may take the view that social science data, just like legal
texts and precedents, are manipulable and can usually support
whatever conclusion a particular author desires. Such skepticism, of
course, can only be reinforced by the battles among experts that play
out in courtrooms every day, where social scientists, doctors,
engineers, and other expert witnesses routinely reach diametrically
opposed conclusions based on similar data.68
To be sure, social scientists and other experts themselves may be
able to sort out who has the better claim in any given dispute, based
on their familiarity with the data and the methodologies employed.69
Judges, however, are going to be relatively disadvantaged in this
regard, unless they have specialized training in the methodologies at
issue. Just as a nonlawyer will often have a difficult time assessing
whether the majority or dissent in a particular case was truer to the
67. For a helpful overview of legal realism and its effects on legal thinking, see Yudof,
supra note 9, at 63-68. For a classic example of the skeptical outlook described above, see
generally Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
68. For a good example, consider Chief Judge Posner's discussion of experts in
trademark disputes in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club
Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994). Posner suggests that the "battle of
experts" in trademark disputes "is frequently unedifying" in part because "[m]any experts
are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to bend their science in the
direction from which their fee is coming." Id.; see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:196, at 32-329 (4th ed.
2002) (discussing some judicial skepticism regarding survey evidence in trademark cases
and suggesting that the skepticism is caused in part by "parties and their attorneys who, in
a desperate search for some kind of evidence, offer, with a straight face, a haphazard, self-
serving 'survey' ").
69. Because of various biases, however, social scientists may have some difficulty here
as well. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effect of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) (noting that professional reviewers' publication
recommendations varied with their personal beliefs regarding the findings of the studies
under review); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Scientists' Evaluations of Research: The Biasing
Effects of the Importance of the Topic, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 322, 322 (1993) (finding that
medical researchers were more likely to overlook methodological flaws in studies about
important topics, such as heart disease, and less likely to overlook them in studies about
less important topics, such as heartburn).
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text or precedent involved, judges will have a difficult time assessing
whether one social scientist or another has rendered a more
methodologically sound report.70
This is not to say that judges or Justices are incapable of sifting
through competing claims and correctly deciding that the evidence,
though disputed, is actually conclusive on a particular point. For this
to occur, however, members of the judiciary would have to be
motivated to allow social science evidence to influence the outcome
directly or at least to inform their views of the issues involved. The
nature of the issues involved in desegregation cases, however, makes
this unlikely.
C. The Nature of the Issues Involved
There is a raging debate among political scientists over the extent
to which law matters. Some, like Spaeth and Segal, argue that law-
the text of constitutions and statutes or precedent-matters very little
compared to the political ideology of the individual judges or
Justices.71 They have sought to document this hypothesis by studying
voting patterns among Justices, which they believe establish that
ideology and preference dwarf other factors in terms of influencing
the decisions of the Justices. Critics have challenged Spaeth and
Segal's methodology, arguing that it rests on too crude a view of the
"law" and fails to capture the extent to which different voting
patterns may rest less on different ideologies than on disagreements
about the law or about the facts and the proper inferences to draw
from those facts.7" Despite the lingering disagreement, it seems fair to
say that neither social scientists nor law professors would argue that
personal preference and ideology never influence the outcome of a
case. The disagreement concerns the magnitude of and occasions for
this influence-not its existence.
My colleague, Mike Klarman, has suggested, from the
perspective of a legal historian, that the influence of law and personal
70. See Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415 ("The judicial constraints on tendentious
expert testimony are inherently weak because judges.., lack training or experience in the
relevant fields of expert knowledge.").
71. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 354-55 (1993); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 287 (1999). For an informative review of Spaeth and Segal's latest
book, which also provides a good overview of the debate among political scientists, see
Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001).
72. See Gillman, supra note 71, at 483-85.
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preference will vary from issue to issue and case to case. He proposes
thinking of a matrix, with law on one axis and politics-meaning a
combination of the judge's values, social mores, and external political
pressure-on the other.73 To oversimplify, where the law is unclear
and political pressure is strong, politics and ideology will dominate
the outcome. Where the law is relatively clear and political pressure
is weak, the law will dominate.74
Professor Klarman's approach offers a useful way to think about
the influence of social science evidence on the outcome of court
decisions. In theory, social science evidence can influence the
outcome of a court decision if the relevant legal standards allow some
consideration of such evidence or if the evidence indirectly influences
a court's view of the issues involved. Whether social science evidence
actually will exert some influence, however, depends in part on the
nature of the issue involved and the strength of the evidence. Think
again of Klarman's matrix, but substitute social science evidence for
the law on one axis, with politics remaining as the other axis. The
more that a judge or Justice has strong political or ideological views
on a particular issue, and the less determinate the social science
research, the less likely it is that social science evidence will play an
influential role. Put differently, the stronger the political or
ideological views, the stronger the social science evidence will have to
be to convince whoever holds those views to change his or her mind.
It is difficult to measure whether judges or Justices have strong
ideological or political views about desegregation. The best evidence
is usually in the opinions themselves, but relying only on the opinions
is circular. Moreover, it is simply impossible to know exactly what
influenced particular decisions, which is the major difficulty with the
approach taken by political scientists like Spaeth and Segal. Even if
one establishes correlations, for example, between outcomes and a
Justice's party affiliation, this does not reveal much about the
influence of other factors.
Notwithstanding this large caveat, it does not seem a stretch to
suggest that judges and Justices are likely to have strong views about
school desegregation. School desegregation is a well known legal and
political issue, which still generates passionate debate in the public
arena, and it was the occasion of one of the Court's most famous
73. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT, RACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 3-4, on file




opinions in the twentieth century. Desegregation decrees also raise
important questions about the legitimacy of judicial interference in
state and local affairs and the proper boundaries of court
intervention. It seems unlikely that a judge or Justice would' fail to
have a fairly strong opinion on such issues.
If this supposition is correct, the burden on social scientists is
formidable: the evidence they present must be strong enough to
influence a judge or Justice who is already predisposed to a particular
course of action. Put differently, the evidence must be strong enough
not simply to help a judge or Justice make up her mind but to change
her mind. Whatever else might be said about the relative strengths or
weaknesses of social science research on the causes of current
desegregation or the benefits of integration, I doubt anyone would
claim that it is sufficiently determinate to alter the views of someone
with strong preconceptions about when desegregation decrees should
be lifted.
There is an additional aspect at play here, which again has to do
with the nature of the issues involved. My suspicion is that most
judges or Justices do not ultimately believe that the questions
presented in desegregation cases need to or should be answered with
reference to social science evidence about the current causes of
desegregation or the costs and benefits of school integration." The
legal standards established for governing these cases, which allow for
little direct consideration of such evidence, suggest as much.
Moreover, that these cases touch on questions about judicial
legitimacy, a topic which judges will naturally feel lies within their
area of expertise, makes it even less likely that courts will turn to
social science evidence to inform them about the propriety of their
continued involvement. Finally, that these cases involve a general
issue-public education-with which judges will have some
familiarity and experience, also makes it unlikely that they will feel
the need to turn to social science evidence to inform their views.
When one considers that the evidence itself is mixed and disputed,
the possibility that it actually exerts either a direct or indirect
influence on the outcome of cases seems exceedingly slight.
To bolster this point, consider two additional pieces of evidence.
The first comes, ironically enough, from social and cognitive
75. This normative question was hotly debated after Brown and the Court's citation
to social science evidence. For an argument against relying on social science evidence to
answer questions about school desegregation (or constitutional rights generally), see
Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 166-68 (1995). For a response, see
Clark, supra note 3, at 227-35.
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psychology and the second from a different area of law-trademark
disputes. Social and cognitive psychologists have compiled a good
deal of research to demonstrate the ubiquity of confirmation or
assimilation bias, which is the tendency of people "to interpret
subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs.
'7 6
Individuals affected by this bias will "dismiss and discount empirical
evidence that contradicts their initial views but will derive support
from evidence, of no greater probativeness, that seems consistent
with their views."77 Additional studies also suggest that mixed or
inconclusive social science evidence will actually increase belief
polarization, making a person more convinced than before of the
correctness of her views.78 It stands to reason that the stronger the
initial beliefs or views, the less likely it is that social science evidence
will change those views, especially if the evidence-as it is in the
context of desegregation-is mixed or inconclusive. It also stands to
reason that judges are not immune from confirmation or assimilation
bias.79
The second bit of evidence is a counterexample from a context
far removed from the politically charged one of desegregation:
trademark disputes.8" In trademark infringement cases, the plaintiff
must show that the alleged infringer's product will cause consumer
76. Lord et al., supra note 69, at 2099. For discussion of and citations to more recent
studies, which reach similar conclusions, see, e.g., Jon D. Hansen & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
630, 647-50 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1053,
1093-94 (2000); Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's Attempt to Turn
Politics Into Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. Summer 2002, at 95,121-23.
77. Lord et al., supra note 69, at 2099.
78. Id.; see also Hansen & Kysar, supra note 76, at 647-48 (citing an experiment that
tested the stubbornness of people's views on capital punishment).
79. To give one pertinent example, in his concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.
70 (1995), Justice Thomas argued against continuing remedial programs in Kansas City,
and he cited to studies which he believed demonstrated that "there simply is no conclusive
evidence that desegregation ... has sparked a permanent jump in the achievement scores
of black children." Id. at 120 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). As he
conceded in the same passage, however, there is evidence that the gap between white and
black test scores narrowed in the last two decades, but he suggested-citing one social
science study in support-that this resulted "more from gains in the socioeconomic status
of black families than from desegregation." Id. Not only is the evidence about the
achievement gains associated with desegregation more mixed than Justice Thomas
describes, see Ryan, supra note 7, at 296-307, but the idea that socioeconomic gains are
responsible for improved achievement ignores the possibility that desegregation itself
played a role in improving the socioeconomic status of black families. Justice Thomas
appears to have interpreted existing evidence to confirm his view that remedial programs
and desegregation should soon cease.
80. Thanks to Larry Walker for suggesting this comparison.
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confusion.8 The preferred method of demonstrating confusion is the
production of consumer surveys.82 Although the surveys themselves
are of varying quality and some judges remain somewhat skeptical of
their use, 3 courts nonetheless rely heavily on them. Indeed, some
courts have begun to draw adverse inferences from the absence of
survey data," which reveals the degree of reliance placed on these
studies and obviously encourages parties to produce them.
Suffice it to say that trademark disputes, which involve questions
like whether Domino's Pizza infringed on the Domino Sugar
trademark85 or whether Seven-Up can label a soft drink "Quirst"
after the soft drink "Squirt" is already on the market,86 do not usually
involve ideologically charged issues. 7 Judges are unlikely to have
prior views about the proper outcome in most of these cases.
Consistent with the findings from social and cognitive psychology,
judges thus are likely to be more open to the findings of social science
studies that bear on these cases. This is surely not the only reason
why social science studies play a more prominent role in these cases,
but it seems plausible to assume that it is one important factor. 8
Indeed, the plausibility of this hypothesis is strengthened by
81. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 93-95 (5th ed. 2002).
82. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical
Answers, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 569, 574; see also Jack P. Lipton, A New Look at the Use of
Social Science Evidence in Trademark Litigation, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 32, 63 (1988)
(noting the growing acceptance of such surveys and commenting that "the failure of a
trademark owner to run a survey may now give rise to an adverse inference").
83. See supra note 68.
84. See, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (per curiam), affd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
85. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1088 (8th Cir. 1980).
87. For a sampling of similar cases, see MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 81, at 95-
119.
88. Additional factors include the two others identified as relevant in the
desegregation context: the legal standard and the nature of the evidence. As for the
former, the legal standard allows ample room for the consideration of social science
evidence, and specifically consumer surveys, as the dispositive question is whether
consumers are likely to be confused by the alleged trademark infringement. As for the
latter, surveys are of varying quality, but "the techniques of testing and sampling buyer
reactions have been developed to a fairly high degree of accuracy." 5 MCCARTHY, supra
note 68. Courts, moreover, have developed fairly clear standards governing the
administration of proper surveys, suggesting that they have gained some expertise in
sorting out flawed and reliable studies. See Bacardi & Co. v. New York Lighter Co., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1335, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that the court set forth standards in a 1983
decision for "governing the administration of a proper likelihood of confusing survey" and
that these standards had been "repeatedly used and cited by courts throughout the
country").
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contrasting the trademark cases with voluntary integration and
affirmative action cases, where survey and other social science
evidence could play an important role but usually does not.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION
Before examining the extent to which the relevant legal
standards allow for consideration of social science evidence, it might
be helpful to provide some background about voluntary integration
plans, as they are not as familiar as their mandatory counterparts.
The term "voluntary integration" refers to integration efforts made
by school districts that are under no compulsion to integrate, either
because they were never subject to a court order or because they have
been declared unitary and released from court supervision. Although
their details vary considerably, there are essentially three major types
of voluntary integration plans: those that involve examination
schools, those that involve magnet schools, and those that offer
structured choices among traditional public schools. Examination
schools use merit-based admissions policies, which typically rely on
test scores as one factor in determining admission.89 Magnet schools
do not have merit-based admissions policies, but like some
examination schools, they are often developed around a particular
theme or curricular focus, such as music and the performing arts or
math and science.9" Choice programs allow students to transfer from
one school to another, either within or outside of the same school
district.9
The common thread linking the plans is'that all rely on racial
criteria to influence if not determine student assignment. Thus, some
districts with examination schools, such as Boston, have taken race
into account when determining admission.92 These programs are akin
to affirmative action plans at colleges and universities. Many districts
with magnet schools have also taken race into account in an attempt
to achieve some measure of racial balance.93 Other school districts
89. For an example, see Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), which
discusses the famous Boston Latin School.
90. For a discussion of magnet and other specialized schools, see, e.g., Jeffrey R.
Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School Choice, in SCHOOL
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 13, 17-19 (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
91. For further discussion of intra- and interdistrict choice programs, see Ryan &
Heise, supra note 29, at 2064-73.
92. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 793.
93. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 126-67 (4th Cir. 1999);
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). See
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have adopted various forms of public school choice plans, some of
which involve structuring or limiting the choices available in order to
produce racially balanced schools or prevent increased imbalance.94
A. The Legal Standards
The legal standards governing voluntary integration programs
are uncertain and warrant some discussion." Since the Supreme
Court decided Croson96 in 1989, it is clear that most government
decisions that rely on race as a factor are subject to strict scrutiny.97
This means that the programs must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.98  It is also clear that remedying prior,
specific acts of race discrimination satisfies strict scrutiny; that is, this
sort of remedial affirmative action is, in the Court's view, a
compelling governmental interest.99 It is unclear whether any other
interests are sufficiently compelling to justify the use of race.
Specifically, it is unclear whether achieving diversity in an educational
setting is a compelling interest."0 If it is, presumably universities
could continue narrowly tailored, race-based affirmative action plans
generally Henig & Sugarman, supra note 90 (discussing magnet schools' imposition of
racial criteria in their admission processes).
94. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 29, at 2064-65, 2070-71 (discussing magnet schools
created to foster voluntary racial integration and interdistrict programs allowing urban
students to attend suburban schools).
95. The discussion that follows is abbreviated on the assumption that readers are
generally familiar with the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. For a more extended
discussion that does not assume such familiarity, see James E. Ryan, Race Discrimination
in Education: A Legal Perspective, 105 TCHRS. C. REC. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at
7-14, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
96. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
97. Id. at 493-95; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225-26
(1995) (refusing to apply a lower standard of review to federal racial classifications).
98. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493-94.
99. Id. at 495.
100. The uncertainty arises from differing interpretations of Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). Some lower
courts read Justice Powell's opinion, which no other Justice joined, as nonetheless
controlling for the Court and thus as establishing that diversity is a compelling interest.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 738-44 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Justice
Powell's opinion was binding and for that reason finding that "achieving a diverse student
body" is a compelling interest), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). Other lower courts
have disagreed, holding that Justice Powell's opinion is not controlling and that diversity is
not a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.
1996) ("[A]ny consideration of race or ethnicity ... for the purpose of achieving a diverse
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."). For an
argument that Justice Powell's opinion is controlling and that Bakke remains a valid
precedent, see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1745, 1753-72 (1996).
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and public school districts might also be able to consider race when
assigning students to schools, be they examination, magnet, or
traditional public schools.
The Supreme Court presumably will decide this Term, in cases
involving affirmative action programs at the University of Michigan
and the University of Michigan Law School, whether diversity in
undergraduate and graduate schools constitutes a compelling
interest. 1 ' Although this decision might be relied upon by lower
courts when assessing the constitutionality of voluntary integration
plans in elementary and secondary schools, it'is not clear that the
contexts are sufficiently alike to warrant identical treatment. There
are two ways in which these issues could be treated differently.
First, the Court could decide to apply different standards to each
context. Although the Court, as mentioned above, has generally
applied strict scrutiny to governmental decisions that rely on race, it
has created a limited exception in the context of voting rights.
Governments can take race into account when drawing voting
districts, without triggering strict scrutiny, provided that race is not
the predominant factor in drawing the district lines. 02 The Court
might allow a similar exception for university affirmative action plans
that use race as one factor, but not the predominant factor, in
determining admission.'0 3 It is not clear that such an exception, were
it made, would also be appropriate for the grade-school context,
where decisions about assigning students are not usually made based
on an overall assessment of the student's merit or background. 1°4
Thus, it may be that universities are ultimately subject to a lower
standard than are grade schools.
101. See Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court May Erect Landmarks: Affirmative Action
Challenge in the Offing, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 2002, at A7.
102. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241, 257-58 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 916 (1995). For discussion of these cases and how they create an exception to
the Court's typical approach to race-based classifications, see Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the
Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1569, 1581-86 (2002).
103. For an argument that the Court should do this, see Karlan, supra note 102, at
1594-98.
104. Public schools that do rely on competitive admissions policies, such as the Boston
Latin School, are more analogous to the university setting and thus may be able to take
advantage of this approach to race-based affirmative action. See supra note 92. This
possibility in turn suggests not only that there are important differences between the
university and grade-school context, but that there are also important differences between
voluntary integration plans. Depending on the legal standards developed to assess
affirmative action, as well as the accepted rationale, if any, for non-remedial affirmative




On the other hand, in the grade-school context, the Court has
traditionally deferred to school officials when adjudicating students'
constitutional rights. When the government is acting in its capacity as
grade-school educator, it is subject to less demanding standards
regarding the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Due
Process rights of students.1 15 Although the Court has not yet shown
similar deference regarding student equal protection rights, it has
suggested in dicta that voluntary efforts to achieve integration are
constitutionally acceptable. This dicta, however, appeared in
Swann,"°6 which predated Croson'017 and thus may no longer be valid
now that the Court believes that strict scrutiny should generally apply
to all racial classifications. Nevertheless, the Court has never
explained why it shows deference to school officials regarding some
rights but not others, and it is possible that the Court would be open
to the argument that school officials should be given some deference
to implement policies designed to achieve integrated schools. Such
policies, after all, do not typically challenge traditional notions of
merit by giving race-based preferences in a competitive admissions
process."8 It cannot usually be said, in other words, that any
particular student "deserves" to be assigned to a particular school
because of his or her special talents or aptitudes.0 9 Considering race
to achieve integrated schools is thus less likely to create stigmatic
harms or foster notions of inferiority, which are costs that the Court
has associated with affirmative action programs and has used as a
justification for subjecting such programs to strict scrutiny.110 Thus, it
is also possible that the Court will hold grade schools to a lower
standard than universities.
105. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335,
1343-69 (2000).
106. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see id. at 16
(acknowledging that school officials "might well conclude ... that in order to prepare
students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro
to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole"). Federal courts
could not order school officials to take such action in the absence of a finding of prior
intentional segregation, but the Court concluded that to take such action voluntarily "as
an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities." Id.
107. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
108. Again, racial preferences at examination schools are an exception.
109. See, e.g., Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D.
Mass. 1999) (emphasizing that assigning grade school students typically does not involve a
merit-based decision), claim dismissed by 98 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D. Mass. 2000).
110. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493-94; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995) (noting that stigmatic harms make a persuasive case for
applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications).
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Even if the Court applies the same compelling interest test in
both contexts, it is not at all clear that the results will be the same.
Whether diversity is or is not a compelling interest at the university
level does not necessarily establish that it is or is not a compelling
interest at the elementary and secondary school level. On the one
hand, courts might conclude that diversity among students is more
important at the university level, where exchanges among students
within and outside of the classroom may seem more integral to
education than exchanges among grade-school students. " On the
other hand, a court might conclude that racial and ethnic integration
among younger students is more important than integration among
older students, given that younger students are generally more
impressionable and thus may benefit more from integration than
older students.'
12
In addition, a court might distinguish between the goal of
student-body diversity and the goal of overcoming de facto racial
isolation in the grade school context. At least one lower court has
recognized these as distinct interests, 3 and there are good reasons
for doing so."'4 Racial isolation is a distinct and historically significant
problem in the context of grade-school education, and it is
conceivable that a court would find that efforts to address this
problem in the grade school context represent an independent,
compelling government interest."5 A court inclined in this direction
may thus find a compelling interest sufficient to justify voluntary
111. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978)
(noting that a great deal of learning at a university occurs informally through interactions
among students from diverse backgrounds); see also Amar & Katyal, supra note 100, at
1773-79 (stressing benefits of diversity in the university setting).
112. Some courts have already suggested as much. See, e.g., Boston's Children First, 62
F. Supp. 2d at 259 (noting that the case involved elementary schools and suggesting that
"[dJiversity may well be more important at this stage than at any other-Kindergarten is
when first friendships are formed and important attitudes shaped").
113. See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 742, 745-47 (2d Cir.
2000).
114. Relying on integration rather than diversity as a goal for affirmative action
policies might also be a better way to defend those policies, as Elizabeth Anderson has
recently argued. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2002). But see Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative
Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 34-46 (2002) (arguing that
the diversity rationale for affirmative action is not especially coherent or persuasive and
that Anderson's attempt to use integration as the rationale has already been foreclosed by
the Supreme Court). But it may be too late to switch rationales at this point, given the
impending ruling by the Supreme Court in the University of Michigan affirmative action
cases, where achieving diversity was the central justification for the policies.
115. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747-53.
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integration plans at the grade-school level, even if diversity is not
considered a compelling interest in universities or grade schools.
All of which is to say that the Court's decision in the University
of Michigan cases 1 6  will not necessarily determine the
constitutionality of voluntary integration plans at the grade-school
level, and that the very standards the Court will apply to those plans
is uncertain. The legality of voluntary integration plans will
ultimately have to await a Court decision specifically addressing
them. In the meantime, lower courts will be left to their own devices
in determining the appropriate legal standards. Thus far, these courts
have uniformly held that voluntary integration plans must satisfy
strict scrutiny, and every court to reach a final decision has found the
plan at issue unconstitutional." 7  Courts that have reached this
conclusion, however, have dodged the question of whether student-
body diversity is a compelling interest by accepting for argument's
sake that it is and then striking down the plans on the ground that
they were not narrowly tailored.118
With this background understood, notwithstanding some
lingering uncertainty, it is possible to assess the extent to which the
relevant legal standards allow for or require reliance on social science
research. Following the lead of the lower federal courts, I will accept
for now that the proper legal standards require answering two
questions: whether the use of race in assigning students serves a
compelling interest and whether any particular program is sufficiently
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The latter question does
not seem to require much reliance on social science research
regarding the costs and benefits of desegregation. The lower court
cases that have addressed the issue of narrow tailoring suggest that
courts will examine the details of the program involved and make a
value judgment as to whether the means adopted for achieving
diversity are limited to achieving that goal."9  Evidence about the
116. See supra note 101.
117. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 129, 132-33 (4th Cir.
1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 704, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794, 808 (1st Cir. 1998). In three cases, courts
have refused to grant preliminary injunctions to halt race-based transfer programs.
Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753; Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D. Mass.
2000), dismissed by 131 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. Mass. 2001); Boston's Children First, 62 F.
Supp. 2d at 262.
118. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130-34; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07; Wessmann, 160 F.3d
at 796-800.
119. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130-34; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07; Wessmann, 160 F.3d
at 796-800.
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scope and operation of the programs, including the intended duration
of the program and whether it relies on any kind of quota or racial
balancing, is certainly relevant.12 ° But research relating to the costs
and benefits of integration is simply irrelevant to the issue of narrow
tailoring.2 '
Such research, however, is directly relevant to the issue of
whether student-body diversity or overcoming de facto segregation is
a compelling interest. Determining whether a particular use of race
satisfies a compelling interest presumably requires asking whether the
consideration of race carries certain benefits that outweigh any costs.
Answering this question would require an examination of the
purported benefits of voluntary integration plans and consideration of
the costs of using race to assign students. In theory, then, there is
more potential for social science research to influence the outcome of
cases challenging voluntary integration plans than there is for similar
research to influence cases seeking to dismantle existing
desegregation decrees.
There are, however, two important limitations on the potential
influence of such research. The first is temporal. The Court could
decide that diversity or overcoming de facto segregation can
constitute compelling interests if a particular integration plan
generates more benefits than costs. More likely, however, the Court
will treat the question as binary and conclude that diversity (or
overcoming de facto segregation) either is or is not a compelling
interest. If the Court takes this latter approach, the ability of social
science evidence to influence the outcome of these cases will be
limited to the cases that precede the Supreme Court's ultimate
decision, as well as the Court's decision itself. Even within this
limited temporal sphere, the second limitation will curb the influence
of social science evidence.
That limitation arises from the fact that the costs and benefits of
using race to assign students cannot all be informed by social science
evidence. Some of the alleged benefits of integration are indeed
conducive to social science research and have been the subject of
extensive study.122 In addition, the Court has identified some
potential costs of using race as a factor in decisionmaking that could
120. See, e.g., Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-08 (discussing these factors in making the
narrowly-tailored determination).
121. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130-34; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-08; Tito v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., No. 97-540-A, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7932, at *1, **17-18 (E.D. Va. May
13, 1997).
122. See supra Part I.B.
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be subjected to social science inquiry,123 including the claim that racial
preferences create stigma and the related danger that programs
purporting to benefit minorities will injure them.124 At the same time,
however, the Court has also suggested that considering race prevents
achieving the normative goal of a colorblind society, where race is
legally irrelevant. 125 That cost, of course, cannot be quantified or
otherwise determined by social science inquiry. Thus, even if social
science studies could show that voluntary integration plans benefit
students, and that these benefits outweigh some of the costs, this is
only part of the equation. The other part requires consideration of
costs that social science research cannot really inform, and it is
anyone's guess as to how a court would weigh any established
benefits against these more abstract costs.
Ultimately, courts must make a normative value judgment as to
whether the benefits of voluntary integration so outweigh the costs
that such plans should be allowed. Although social science research is
relevant to this task and could thus inform a court's judgment,
including the Supreme Court's judgment, the strength of the research
and the nature of the issues involved reduce the likelihood that such
research will be very influential.
B. The Nature and Strength of the Social Science Evidence
Given that the social science research pertinent to this issue is
similar to the research relevant to dismantling desegregation decrees,
I will not belabor the points made above. The key point to recognize
is that the compelling interest standard is strongly tilted against any
use of race in government programs, which means that if this is
indeed the appropriate standard to apply, the burden on those
seeking to justify voluntary integration plans will be heavy. Social
science evidence pertaining to integration generally, as already
discussed, is often equivocal and subject to conflicting interpretations.
In addition, just like cases involving desegregation decrees, cases
involving the constitutionality of voluntary integration plans feature
dueling experts. Those challenging the plans hire experts who testify
and present studies showing that the social and academic gains from
integration are limited at best, while those defending them hire
123. As discussed below, see infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text, although these
costs-could be informed by social science data, the Court does not seem interested in such
evidence.
124. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
125. Id. at 505-06; see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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experts who paint a more positive and optimistic picture of the
benefits of integration.126 Given the difficulty of demonstrating that
any use of race is compelling, presumably social science evidence
would have to be fairly strong and consistent in order to influence a
court's decision. As it stands, however, the social science evidence, at
least as it is presented to courts, is mixed at best.
To the extent national or case specific studies about integration
are indeterminate, there is less reason to expect that such studies will
influence the outcome of cases involving voluntary integration plans.
It is also less likely that the Supreme Court, when it finally confronts
this issue, will be influenced by social science research on the topic.
The nature of the issues involved, finally, reduces the potential
influence of social science research even further.
C. The Nature of the Issues Involved
Voluntary integration plans raise the difficult question of when,
if ever, it is appropriate for the government to use race as a factor in
decisionmaking. Although there is no way to measure this, I strongly
suspect that most judges and Justices have quite firm views about this
issue. Moreover, I suspect that most of them see this question as
requiring a normative, moral judgment.'27  To be sure, one's
normative judgment about the general propriety of using race might
initially be informed by a sense of how the world works and, in
particular, a sense of the inevitability of racial segregation or the
importance of integrated schools. Social science research on these
topics might, at some point in his or her thinking, influence a judge's
views. It seems much more plausible to suppose, however, that
judges are like most other educated nonspecialists, in that their world
views are only weakly influenced by hard data. Once those views are
formed, moreover, they may create something of a presumption
about the mechanics of society, which could potentially be overcome,
126. For example, in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 100 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass.
2000) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction), dismissed by 131 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D.
Mass. 2001), one of the few cases to go to trial, plaintiffs presented expert testimony that
discounted the benefits of integration, while defendants presented expert testimony
extolling those benefits. Telephone Interview with Chinh Quang Le, Assistant Counsel,
NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund, Inc. (Jan. 9, 2003).
127. Cf. John E. Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction: Serrano Among the People
of Number, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 50, 51-53
(Ray C. Rist & Ronald J. Anson eds., 1977) (expressing doubt that courts in race
discrimination or school finance cases rely on social science evidence in part because




but only if the evidence is reasonably clear and one remains
sufficiently open-minded to study the evidence. 28 It seems fair to say
that the evidence regarding the benefits of school desegregation is not
sufficiently clear to dislodge any but the most weakly held beliefs
about the propriety of using race as a criterion in education programs.
To get a better sense of the points I am trying to illuminate,
consider three concrete examples, each representing a different
approach to the issue of when it is appropriate to use race as a factor
in government programs. The first two come from the Supreme
Court's decision in Adarand.129 On the one hand, Justices Scalia and
Thomas strongly believe that it is almost never appropriate to use
race as a factor in government decisionmaking. As Justice Scalia
argued in his concurring opinion: "To pursue the concept of racial
entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is
to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred."'3 °  Justice
Thomas went further: "I believe," he wrote, "that there is a 'moral
[and] constitutional equivalence' between laws designed to subjugate
a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order
to foster some current notion of equality." '131
Justice Thomas wrote in response to a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice Ginsburg.
Contrary to Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens argued that there is "no
moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination."'32  "Invidious discrimination," he continued, "is an
engine of oppression," while "[r]emedial race-based preferences
reflect ... a desire to foster equality in society."'33 Justices Thomas
and Scalia obviously entertain different beliefs than do Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, but notice that all of them cast the issue in
vaguely or explicitly moral terms and that none of them suggests that
their beliefs might change with a new empirical study concerning the
benefits or costs of some race-based program.
128. Studies regarding confirmation and assimilation bias suggest as much. See supra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
129. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
130. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
132. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
133. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The separate concurrences of Justices Scalia and Thomas are
especially noteworthy because each Justice identifies potential costs
of racial preferences that social science could inform. Justice Scalia,
for example, suggests that racial preferences lead to racial hatred,134
which presumably could be tested through surveys that assess
whether affirmative action programs increase or decrease racial
hostility among participants and observers. Justice Thomas is even
more specific in suggesting that affirmative action programs:
[i]nevitably ... engender attitudes of superiority or,
alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe
that they have been wronged by the government's use of
race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of
inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or
to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to
preferences.'35
Again, survey evidence, like the sort routinely relied upon by
courts in trademark cases, presumably could shed light on the
veracity of Justice Thomas's suppositions. But it is hard to believe
that Justice Thomas is inviting such inquiry or advancing what he
considers falsifiable hypotheses. The costs are simply presumed,
much in the same way that the Court in early desegregation cases
presumed that prior segregation had lingering or widespread effects.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, in making empirical assertions without
inviting empirical inquiry, indicate that they do not believe the
constitutionality of racial preferences should depend on social science
evidence. 3 6 Just as importantly, it seems highly unlikely that these
Justices would give much weight to social science data that
contradicted their assertions.'37
Contrast this with the approach taken by Chief Judge Richard
Posner in Wittmer v. Peters,38 which raised the question of whether a
boot camp style prison for young offenders could consider race when
hiring prison guards.'39 Judge Posner relied explicitly on expert
testimony offered by the defendants, which stated that the boot camp
would not succeed in its mission if there were not more black prison
134. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 119-20 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that "social science research" in a desegregation case "certainly cannot form
the basis upon which we decide matters of constitutional principle").
137. See supra notes 76-78 (discussing assimilation bias).
138. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
139. Id. at 917-18.
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guards, given that the prison population was majority black. 140
Although the experts who offered this testimony had little direct
experience with boot camp style prisons, and although they relied on
social science evidence regarding traditional prisons, their opinions
were both plausible and not contradicted by plaintiffs.141 Under these
circumstances, Judge Posner concluded that race could be used as a
factor in hiring prison guards, at least until enough evidence was
gathered to demonstrate that there was little need for some
correspondence between the race of the guards and the race of the
inmates. 
142
One could quarrel with Judge Posner's reliance on fairly thin
social science evidence, but the relevant point for this Essay is that his
approach to the issue of using race as a factor in government
decisionmaking is strikingly different from that of Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Stevens, and Ginsburg. Rather than framing the issue as
one involving a basic moral choice, Judge Posner's approach is
pragmatic and explicitly tied to existing social science evidence and
expert opinion. Judge Posner's approach, for better or for worse, is
most likely exceptional among federal judges who confront the
question of when race can be used as a decisionmaking factor. It is
certainly not the approach taken by the Justices currently sitting on
the Supreme Court, most, if not all, of whom-depending on when
the Court finally hears a relevant case-will ultimately decide the fate
of voluntary integration plans. For these Justices, the use of race
raises basic moral and philosophical issues, which social science
evidence can at most only weakly and indirectly inform.
III. LOOKING AHEAD
One of the points of this Conference, and the papers in this
Symposium, is to consider strategies for preserving or creating racially
integrated schools. I have focused so far on the two most obvious
strategies. But advocates, lawyers, or social scientists interested in
fostering racially integrated schools should recognize that attempting
to preserve existing desegregation decrees or promoting and
protecting voluntary racial integration plans are not the only tools
available. For this reason, it makes some sense to consider
alternative strategies and to examine whether social science evidence
might be more influential in connection with these alternative
140. Id. at 920.
141. See id. at 920-21.
142. See id.
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approaches. There are at least three alternatives: socioeconomic
integration plans; claims based on state education clauses; and Title
VI disparate impact claims. Each of these three routes may offer
more promise of success, but social science evidence will likely
remain only tangentially relevant to the various court decisions along
the way. The only cases that might offer more room for social science
evidence to be influential would be those based on state education
clauses. I will discuss each alternative, briefly, in turn.
A. Socioeconomic Integration
A few school districts across the country have instituted some
type of socioeconomic integration plan. 43 Some officials responsible
for such programs have likely been motivated, at least in part, by a
recognition that race-based plans are constitutionally problematic and
that socioeconomic integration is an indirect, if second best, way to
achieve racial integration. Others may have been motivated by the
fairly strong and consistent social science evidence establishing the
academic benefits of majority-middle-class schools.144
If and when those plans are challenged in court, however, social
science evidence regarding the benefits of socioeconomic integration
will largely be irrelevant. The reason has to do with the legal
standard that will be employed. The use of socioeconomic status to
determine student assignment is obviously racially neutral, and it will
not trigger strict scrutiny unless it can be shown that the legislators
intended to use socioeconomic status as a proxy for race. 145 If such an
intent can be demonstrated, which is a difficult showing to make,146
the case would become identical to one challenging voluntary race-
based integration plans. If such intent cannot be proven, any
socioeconomic integration plan will be subject to rational basis
scrutiny, which is notoriously simple to satisfy. 147 Proof that there are
real benefits to socioeconomic integration is not necessary to pass this
test; it is enough if legislators could rationally have believed that
socioeconomic integration would be beneficial. Although social
science evidence regarding socioeconomic integration is obviously
143. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-
CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 228-57 (2001).
144. See id. at 23-76.
145. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-45 (1976).
146. Those challenging such racially neutral plans presumably would have to
demonstrate that the plans were adopted not in spite of, but because of their racial effects.
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-79 (1979).
147. See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 591-92 (1979); Ry. Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,110 (1949).
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relevant to establish this point, it would be an exaggeration to say that
the evidence will influence the outcome, because the outcome would
be pre-ordained by the selection of the rational basis test.'48
B. State Education Clause Claims
Another potential route to secure racial or socioeconomic
integration is to raise a claim based on the education clauses that exist
within every state constitution. A number of courts have held, in the
context of school finance cases, that such clauses guarantee an
"adequate" education.'49 Although most cases have revolved around
whether a state provides sufficient funds to deliver an adequate
education, there is no theoretical reason why adequacy needs to be
defined solely in monetary terms. Plaintiffs interested in racial or
socioeconomic integration could argue that such integration, along
with sufficient funding, is necessary to provide an adequate
education. 151 Indeed, plaintiffs successfully raised such a claim in
Connecticut, in the now famous Sheff v. O'Neill case.' Similar
claims were raised in Minnesota,' in a case that resulted in a
settlement, and in Rochester, in a case that is still pending.
53
If any claim could turn on social science evidence, this would be
it. The main reason is that the legal standards for determining what
constitutes an adequate education are completely open-ended.
Courts are essentially free to decide for themselves what ingredients
are necessary to provide students an adequate education, and many
have not been shy about identifying those ingredients. 54 At the very
least, social science evidence regarding racial and/or socioeconomic
integration would be directly relevant to the question of whether
either or both are necessary aspects of an adequate education. In
theory, then, there is much more room for social science evidence
148. To be fair, it is possible that the strength of the social science evidence regarding
the benefits of socioeconomic integration might help convince a court that such a plan was
adopted to achieve those benefits rather than as a proxy for a race-based plan. The
stronger the benefits, the more plausible it is to believe that legislators were not simply
looking for a way to achieve racial integration through a facially neutral program.
149. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 266-72.
150. For further discussion of this point, see James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 553-60 (1999). If voluntary racial
integration plans are held unconstitutional, of course, state courts interpreting state
education clauses could only require socioeconomic and not racial integration.
151. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
152. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 143, at 175-77 (discussing the litigation).
153. Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
154. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)
(enumerating the characteristics of an "efficient" system of common schools).
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regarding the benefits of either racial or socioeconomic integration to
influence the outcome of such decisions.
There are reasons to remain skeptical, however, about the extent
to which the social science research itself will influence the outcome
of any cases alleging that an adequate education requires racial
integration. Those reasons relate to the earlier discussion of
desegregation and voluntary integration.155 The evidence regarding
the benefits of integration is contested. The issue itself, moreover, is
likely to be seen in moral or philosophical terms, and it is an issue
about which courts will likely have strong, preconceived views.
There may be more room for social science evidence to influence
the outcome of claims that education clauses require socioeconomic
integration. Here, the evidence that socioeconomic integration is
academically beneficial is generally stronger and more consistent than
similar evidence regarding racial integration.'56 Moreover, although
this is speculative, it may be that courts have less strongly held views
about socioeconomic integration than they do about racial
integration, and they may be more willing to view the issue in
instrumental rather than moral or philosophical terms. On the other
hand, socioeconomic and racial integration often go hand-in-hand,
and regardless of the precise correlation, they may be viewed as
linked. A court's views about the propriety of racial integration thus
might determine its views about socioeconomic integration, which
would reduce the influence of social science evidence accordingly.
Nonetheless, if there is one legal context where social science
evidence might be useful in influencing a court decision to require
integration, this is probably it. Although the integration would be
along socioeconomic lines, socioeconomic integration in many areas
of the country would produce a decent amount of racial integration as
well.
C. Title VI Disparate Impact Claims
Another intriguing possible claim could be based on the
disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act.'57 Title VI prohibits programs receiving
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race, and it permits
155. See supra Parts IB, IC, II.B, I.C.
156. For discussion of this evidence and citations to the literature, see KAHLENBERG,
supra note 143, at 23-46; Ryan, supra note 7, at 297-307.
157. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)).
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federal agencies to establish regulations to implement the statute.'58
The Department of Education, like other federal agencies, adopted
regulations that prohibit not only intentional discrimination but also
policies that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of race. 5 9
Courts have interpreted these regulations to create a disparate impact
standard of liability, and the cases operate similarly to those brought
pursuant to Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment.
Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of demonstrating a racially disparate,
adverse impact. If plaintiffs succeed, defendants then must
demonstrate, in the education context, that the challenged practice is
an "educational necessity." If defendants meet their burden,
plaintiffs can still succeed if they identify an equally effective
alternative policy that does not have a disparate impact or if they
demonstrate that the policy is really a pretext for intentional
discrimination.
160
To date, most disparate impact claims have challenged tracking,
high stakes testing, and funding schemes.161 A disparate impact claim
could be brought, however, challenging school districting policies that
result in racial isolation. Indeed, plaintiffs in the Rochester case
alluded to above included a Title VI claim along with their claim that
an adequate education, guaranteed by the state education clause,
requires racial and socioeconomic integration. 162 Although the theory
underlying the Title VI claim is not discussed in the reported
decisions, it is easy enough to describe a plausible theory. Where
residential segregation exists between municipalities, and school
district lines track municipal boundaries, plaintiffs could argue that
the school district lines result in segregated schools. Given that
minorities are disproportionately poor and that concentrated poverty
in schools creates obstacles that majority-middle-class schools need
not face, plaintiffs could argue that the segregation that results from
existing school districting policies causes a disparate, adverse impact
based on race. In effect, plaintiffs could use the fairly strong body of
evidence regarding the difficulties created by concentrated poverty to
bolster their claim that de facto racial segregation has an adverse
impact on minority students-for the simple reason that minority
students will often, as a result, end up in majority poor schools.
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-e (2000).
159. Regulations for the Offices of the Department of Education, Office for Civil
Rights, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2002).
160. See Ryan, supra note 95 (manuscript at 11-13).
161. Id. (manuscript at 29-39).
162. Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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Although such a claim might be theoretically plausible, at least
two serious obstacles confront it. The first is that plaintiffs may no
longer be able to base any claims on the disparate impact regulations.
In Alexander v. Sandoval,163 decided in 2001, the Supreme Court held
that the disparate impact regulations of Title VI do not create a
private right of action."6 The regulations, the Court concluded, do
not create individually enforceable rights.'65 Left undecided by
Sandoval was whether plaintiffs could bring their claims pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.166 The Court's subsequent decision in Gonzaga
University v. Doe,167 however, seems to foreclose this possibility. In
Gonzaga, the Court held that § 1983 is only available to enforce
clearly established individual rights. 168 Given that the Court held in
Sandoval that the regulations do not create such rights,'169 Gonzaga
seems to preclude their being enforced by § 1983. If this is correct,
only the Department of Education can enforce the disparate impact
regulations. This, in turn, will significantly diminish the number of
disparate impact claims decided by federal courts, especially during
times when those leading federal agencies are politically opposed to
challenging facially neutral practices that have a racially disparate
impact.
Even if some disparate impact claims make it to court, the legal
standards make it unlikely that the social science evidence regarding
the benefits of socioeconomic integration will influence the outcome.
The key here is the showing required to demonstrate an "educational
necessity." Although this standard seems to place a significant
burden on defendants to justify the challenged policy or practice,
courts have lightened defendants' load by interpreting "educational
necessity" to mean, essentially, "educationally legitimate."'70 That is,
courts typically have concluded that defendants satisfy their burden if
they can show that the challenged policy has a demonstrable
relationship to a legitimate educational goal. Courts, moreover, seem
quite willing to defer to education officials on this issue. 7'
163. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
164. Id. at 293.
165. Id. at 288-89.
166. See id. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
168. Id. at 321.
169. 532 U.S. at 293.
170. GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 679-80 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
171. See, e.g., Georgia NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1420 (1985) (holding that the




Consider the treatment given to the Title VI claim raised by
plaintiffs in the Rochester case. 112 The, court there was willing to
accept, for the sake of argument, that plaintiffs succeeded in
demonstrating a disparate impact. 7 3 In the next line, however, the
court concluded, without explanation, that defendants' districting
policy was nonetheless justified because defendants had a substantial
interest in maintaining residency requirements.174 This, of course, is a
non sequitur, as de facto racial segregation could be addressed by
altering district lines and maintaining residency requirements within
the newly created districts. But it gives a hint of what the general
judicial reaction to such a claim might be.
The better response to plaintiffs' claim, and the one that will
surely be offered if such claims are brought in the future, is that states
and localities have a legitimate interest in maintaining neighborhood
schools. It is unlikely that states and localities will offer hard proof in
support of the proposition that neighborhood school assignments are
preferable to other alternatives; instead, they will likely point to the
convenience and sense of community created by neighborhood school
assignments. This, in turn, will most likely be more than enough to
satisfy a court, especially in light of the deference given to defendants
in these cases. Given the predominance of neighborhood schools and
the abiding attachment to them throughout the country, it is very
unlikely that a court will question the legitimacy of this interest.
The possibility that social science evidence will influence the
outcome of a Title VI claim is, in any event, quite remote. This sort
of claim, even if focused on the educational harms of concentrated
poverty, ultimately raises the question of whether courts should order
mandatory racial integration. As discussed above, social science
evidence will not likely influence decisions regarding the legality of
voluntary integration plans. There is no reason to think that it will
have more influence *over claims for mandatory racial integration.
Indeed, given the direction of desegregation cases and the
dismantling of desegregation decrees, 75 the likelihood that federal
courts would use Title VI regulations to restart mandatory
desegregation seems sufficiently slim that it would be unrealistic to
suppose that social science evidence will influence these cases.
172. Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
173. Id. at 344.
174. Id.
175. See supra Part I.A.2.
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CONCLUSION
One might ask where this analysis leaves lawyers and social
scientists interested in fostering integrated schools, aside from slightly
dejected. What, if anything, might be done? Although I think it is an
uphill battle, I do think several strategies are available.
The key step, I think, is to develop strong arguments in favor of
allowing school districts discretion to adopt voluntary integration
programs, as I describe below. But it must first be recognized that
preventing a finding of unitary status by employing social science data
is likely a lost cause. To be sure, there are hundreds of decrees still in
place, mostly because no one has bothered to move for unitary status
in those districts.'76 Documenting the benefits of these plans may
indeed forestall motions for unitary status, especially if the decrees
are not causing controversy. Lawyers for the original plaintiffs in
these cases should thus consider whether a study documenting the
specific benefits of a particular plan might carry some strategic,
political benefits. This may indeed buy some time. But it will not, of
course, preserve desegregation decrees forever. It is inevitable that
they will all be dismantled, regardless of potentially relevant social
science research on the extent and costs of any ensuing resegregation.
Which leads to the next point: how to fight to preserve voluntary
integration plans. Here, I think the lawyers should have the laboring
oar, at least initially. Lawyers should focus less on social science
evidence per se and more on the pertinent legal standards. As
discussed above, the appropriate legal standard to apply to voluntary
integration plans is uncertain. Lawyers obviously must be prepared
to respond to the Supreme Court's upcoming decision in the
affirmative action cases. In doing so, they should focus on two
arguments.
First, they should develop the argument, sketched in Part II.A,
that school officials should not be subject to strict scrutiny when they
act to promote integrated elementary and secondary schools.
Regardless of the standard used to assess university affirmative action
plans, lawyers ought to argue that something less than strict scrutiny
should govern voluntary integration plans at the grade school level.
Second, lawyers should continue to develop arguments that racial
integration is uniquely important at the grade-school level. Whether
the Court concludes that diversity is or is not a compelling interest at
the university level, lawyers defending voluntary integration plans
176. See Parker, supra note 58, at 1159-60.
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should argue that integration in grade schools is sufficiently important
to satisfy whatever legal standard is ultimately applied. In making
both of these arguments, lawyers should emphasize the historical
commitment, begun in Brown, to create integrated schools, and they
should also emphasize how assigning students to grade schools is
fundamentally different from apportioning limited spaces, on the
basis of merit, in universities.177
To make the argument that racial integration is uniquely
important at the grade school level, lawyers should work closely with
social scientists to develop compelling evidence about a particularly
successful plan. That is to say, lawyers should be strategic in selecting
the cases that they pursue on appeal. Lawyers defending voluntary
integration plans cannot select the plans that will be challenged in
court, but they can determine which unfavorable rulings to appeal.
They should be careful to select those plans that have the most well
documented benefits. To be sure, for reasons explained at length
above, this evidence may ultimately fail to persuade a court that is
committed to striking down voluntary integration plans, but
developing a strong record certainly cannot hurt. Moreover, to the
extent lawyers can make arguments about voluntary integration that
incline courts to uphold such plans by emphasizing the historical
commitment to integrated education and the absence of merit-based
issues in school assignments, courts might be more favorably inclined
toward social science evidence that supports such plans. For this to
work, however, lawyers and social scientists should steer clear of
national studies, which can easily be contradicted by other, similarly
broad studies. Instead, they should build their case and their
evidence around the particular plan at issue.
Whether the effort to defend voluntary racial integration plans is
successful or not, lawyers, advocates, and social scientists should also
be making the political case for socioeconomic integration. As
discussed earlier, the evidence regarding the benefits of
socioeconomic integration is quite strong, and it may be that there is
less political opposition to such integration than there is to racial
integration. The effort to promote socioeconomic integration,
however, has thus far been sporadic and disorganized. Some may
177. For an argument along these lines, see Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 66 (D. Mass. 2000) (emphasizing that race-based transfer plans did not
involve any issues of merit: "The policies do not grant preferences to students of one race
who are objectively less qualified than students of other races. Unlike many challenged
race-based programs, more qualified applicants are not excluded from access to a scarce
resource or benefit"), dismissed by 131 F. Supp. 2d 253 (D. Mass. 2001).
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doubt that a push for socioeconomic integration would yield results,
but in my mind, there is no way to tell without first making the effort.
If and when such plans are adopted, as they have been in several
school districts, 171 they almost surely will be upheld as constitutional,
given that they should not trigger strict scrutiny.
In short, there are reasons to be gloomy about the prospects for
school integration, especially along racial lines. But the situation is
not hopeless. By working together to present sound legal theories
and a strong political case for racial and socioeconomic integration,
lawyers and social scientists may yet be able to prevent our schools
from becoming even more racially and socioeconomically segregated
than they are today.
79
178. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 143, at 228-57.
179. For data on current levels of racial and socioeconomic segregation, see Ryan &
Heise, supra note 29, at 2092-96.
1702 [Vol. 81
